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複製人 Human Cloning

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摘要

本文的主要目的是要說明怎樣建構一具普遍意義的中國生命倫理學。在本文的第一部分裏，筆者提出了一個“三層架構”的方法學框架來說明建構具普通意義的中國生命倫理學的可能性。本文的第二部分則主要是通過考察複製人類的道德問題為上述的建構工作提供一個實例。在這個部分裏面，筆者提出了一個儒家傳統的中介原則的理論框架，並通過此一理論框架來考察複製人類的道德問題。根據有關的中介原則，複製人類是否道德上可接受主要視乎複製人類的活動是否會對別人構成傷害。筆者分別考察反對者經常採用的(亦是最主要的)兩個“傷害論證”，並指出它們皆含有不合理的前提。

目錄

摘要

人的複製是否違反人的尊嚴？本文論證，這一問題的答案取決於道德共同體的具體尊嚴觀。在當代多元代的道德境遇中，強制推行一種特定的、官方的尊嚴倫理學得不到道德辯護。從官方的尊嚴倫理學轉向個人的尊嚴倫理學，進而轉向共同體的尊嚴倫理學道德上不可避免的。

儒學對於親子關係持有規範的看法，它是儒學尊嚴觀的不可或缺的內在部分，而人的複製損害人的親子關係，因而是違反儒學所持的人的尊嚴觀的。信奉儒學信念的人們不應當試圖使儒學成為獨霸性的國家意識形態，而是應該以自願的見證精神維護儒家共同體的價值。

目錄

摘要

複製人實質上就是複製活過或仍活著的人的基因組合。本文嘗試就以下列五方面探討體胞核移植法在人類身上的應用所引起的社會倫理問題。

- (一)基因等同：兩個人是否可以共有同一基因組合？
- (二)基因歷史：複製者的基因並非是一個新的、獨特的基因組合。這基因曾有的(即被複製者的)歷史對複製者是否有負面影響？
- (三)基因傳遞方式：無性生殖方法的基因傳遞對複製者是否有負面影響？
- (四)基因複製風險：複製帶給複製者什麼風險？
- (五)基因複製權：基因複製權衍生出什麼倫理問題？

對全面支持複製科技在人類的應用的論者來說，複製只是另類生殖方法，提供人多一個生殖途徑的選擇。複製對他人並無傷害，對社會沒有負面影響。即或有任何傷害或影響，也都是可以接受。因此，在一般情況下，複製人科技不應該遭受社會的禁止。

本文的討論顯示這是過度樂觀的看法。以「基因複製產生身分混淆」的反對說法固然不成立。然而，基因過往的歷史，無性生殖的方式，複製初階的風險，以及棘手的基因複製法律問題及由此再衍生的倫理問題等，這些對複製孩子，人倫關係，家庭結構及社會穩定所可能造成的負面衝擊和嚴重傷害是不容忽視的。複製人科技即使可行，也應該在極嚴格的監管下進行。

更重要的是，複製人的社會倫理震撼是國際社會的共同關注。因此，複製人的支持者必須對國際社會的深切關注與廣泛責難提供強而有力的證據與回應。在國際社會對複製人仍有極大疑慮時即匆促容許複製人的出現，肯定是極不負責的做法。

有何倫理判準支持複製人？

沈清松

摘要

本文從儒家倫理學與西方效益論、義務論、德行論等三種倫理學理論中，抽繹出自我保存、自我發展、自由意志、能力卓越、關係和諧等五項倫理判準，用以考量複製人的倫理問題。基本上，本文主張「自我保存」是支持複製人的最有力論證，雖然此一論證仍有其缺陷。若以自我保存作為唯一的論據，仍有所不足，但它仍然是一個最低要求(minimum requirement)的論證。若就發展而言，可分就多樣化和性質優化兩種發展來考量。複製人基本上是一相反多樣化、差異化研究方案，不過它仍可因為保存瀕臨滅亡的家庭、種族等而間接有助於多樣化。至於性質優化則需經由自由意志的努力方能成為道德的。此外，自由意志、卓越化和和諧化等判準看來，複製人仍存在着許多倫理問題，將在本文中一一分析。

目錄

克隆人：一個無害的例証？

Melinda A. Roberts

摘要

有些人反對在實驗室中克隆人類前胚胎，理由是，這一過程有損人類前胚胎的尊嚴，是對人類前胚胎的不尊重。另一些人則論証說，與人類前胚胎不同，個人顯然有權利受到我們的尊重和關心，如果可以預見人體克隆對個人將是有益的，或者至少不會造成麻煩，那就應該允許克隆人。基於後一種觀點，法律理論家 John A. Robertson 論証說，既然克隆無害於顯然有權受到我們尊重和關心的任何人，那麼，應該允許克隆。他特別論証說，克隆子女不可能真的因克隆而受到傷害，因為他們會把他們的存在歸功於克隆過程。我在本文中將証明，克隆及其相關的過程事實上確實使現實中的人體克隆子女處在受到真正傷害的危險之中。因此，我為探究克隆及其相關技術在道德上的可允許性提供了一個基礎，但我並沒有暗示，人類前胚胎有尊嚴，或者應當受到尊重。

目錄

摘要

認為新生殖技術會誘使人“扮演上帝的角色”這種反對意見是常見的。本文考查三種反對意見：1) 這些技術“侵佔了上帝在生殖的領地”；2) 這些技術使我們能夠“製造”我們的子女；以及3) 這些技術使我們否認人類的局限性。這些反對意見都沒有提供決定性的理由來反對新生殖技術；每一種反對意見都要求進一步提供令人信服的論據。然而，已表明不要“扮演上帝的角色”的警告，在關於醫學輔助生殖的爭論中起着重要的規觀作用，需要對在新生殖方式情境中的生物共同性、局限性以及負責的共同創造性的意義進行反思。

Abstract

This paper aims to tell a story about Chinese bioethics that appears to be attractive. The crux of it is to show how to work out a Chinese bioethics which is able to retain enough essential elements of Chinese philosophy and at the same time to provide guidance and advice rationally acceptable to the citizens of a constitutional democratic society as to bioethical issues. The crucial part of the story is to exhibit a methodological framework for such Chinese bioethics. I shall take up this job in the first part of this paper. In the second part of this paper, I shall make use of this methodological framework to analyze the ethics of human cloning.

This paper begins by specifying three major tasks of Chinese bioethics: (i) delineate the scope of fundamental questions of Chinese bioethics; (ii) carry out what I shall call an 'internal survey' of the traditions of Chinese philosophy in relation to bioethical issues; (iii) provide ethical rules and guidance for the public sphere as to bioethical issues.

With respect to the first task, this paper proposes to distinguish three areas of questions. The first area consists of those bioethical questions that are of current interest and concern to bioethicists in general. The second area consists of those bioethical questions that are peculiar to the traditions of Chinese philosophy. For instance, Confucianism takes familial relationship and virtues as of utmost importance. Then, how to formulate a health care policy that can enhance the familial relationship among family members and virtues of individuals would be a question of great concern to the Confucian. The third area consists of questions that are particularly related to the methodology of Chinese bioethics. For instance, how to lay out a sound methodology for Chinese bioethics is a question that belongs to this area.

As to the second task, the aim is to reconstruct the fundamental bioethical principles of the philosophical traditions of Chinese philosophy and apply these principles to the bioethical issues. In accomplishing this aim, we need to study the relevant documentary materials as well as the comprehensive doctrines of the philosophical traditions of Chinese philosophy and to deduce or formulate the relevant principles on the basis of this study.

Now let us turn to the third important task of Chinese bioethics, which is the most challenging one among the three. Before probing into the crux of this task,

some preliminaries are in order. First, the idea of public sphere is understood here as a conception of public sphere that belongs to a conception of a constitutional democratic society. It is defined as a sphere generated by the communicative actions of all equal and free citizens of a constitutional democratic society, the purpose of which is to provide point of views, reasons; rules or procedures for resolving conflicts among these citizens. Second, as a basic feature of a constitutional democratic society, citizens who are involved in the public sphere are expected to belong to different religious, philosophical or moral traditions and therefore hold very different or even conflicting comprehensive doctrines. A comprehensive doctrine, to follow Rawls' use, 'includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole.' And it is unlikely that we can provide rational arguments to settle the question of truth in respect of these comprehensive doctrines or to show that one of the existing comprehensive doctrines is the best among others.

Given these two preliminaries, we can see why the third task of Chinese bioethics is so challenging: In the first place, its major aim, as specified above, is to provide ethical rules and guidance for the public sphere as to bioethical issues. And the public sphere is constituted by the communicative actions of all equal and free citizens. Then, if this task is to succeed, the ethical rules and guidance provided must be rationally acceptable to these citizens. In the second place, as we have pointed out, in a constitutional democratic society, citizens may belong to different religious, philosophical or moral traditions whose comprehensive doctrines are so different or even conflicting. In other words, in such a society, a citizen can be a Confucian, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhist, Taoist, Catholic or a member of any other traditions. In the third place, since Chinese bioethics is founded upon Chinese philosophy, the ethical rules and guidance in question must be heavily shaped by the comprehensive doctrines of the traditions of Chinese philosophy. Then how is it possible for Chinese bioethics to succeed in providing ethical rules and guidance that are also rationally acceptable to those citizens belonging to the traditions other than those of Chinese philosophy? Here is the dilemma: On the one hand, if the ethical rules and guidance in question are so heavily shaped by the comprehensive doctrines of the traditions of Chinese philosophy, then there is no reason to expect citizens who belong to other traditions

to accept them. On the other hand, if the ethical rules and guidance in question have nothing, or too little, to do with the traditions of Chinese philosophy, then Chinese bioethics will lose its distinctiveness.

This paper proposes a 'three-levels' methodological framework to solve the above dilemma. This methodological framework includes three different parts: (i) the fundamental moral principles of a tradition; (ii) intermediate principles; and (iii) overlapping consensus about bioethical issues. The basic idea of this framework rests on the fact that although different traditions have different or even conflicting comprehensive doctrines, they may have overlapping consensus about bioethical issues. This consensus is a set of bioethical judgements commonly affirmed by the comprehensive doctrines of different traditions. The crucial step of the framework is to develop some intermediate principles of a tradition on the basis of this consensus. The intermediate principles developed have to satisfy two requirements. First, they imply only the bioethical judgements of the overlapping consensus. Second, they must have logical connection with the fundamental moral principles of the tradition. To apply this methodological framework to Chinese bioethics, we first need to identify the fundamental moral principles of the traditions of Chinese philosophy and then to derive the intermediate principles from these fundamental moral principle.

The second part of this paper attempts to apply the above methodological framework to develop a set of intermediate principles that are related to the tradition of Confucianism and use them to discuss the ethics of human cloning. They are listed as follows: (i) 'Do no harm' principle; (ii) 'Freedom to reproduce' principle; (iii) 'Causing to exist can benefit' principle; (iv) 'Freedom to know' principle; (v) 'Knowledge as a kind of human good' principle; (vi) 'Will-based' nonidentity principle. It is the present author's view that, as long as cloning human beings does not harm any human person, research directly or indirectly related to human cloning should not be entirely prohibited. It will be argued in this part that this view is supported by the above intermediate principles. Briefly, according to the 'Do no harm' principle, if cloning human beings will cause harm to some human person, then researchers should not be allowed to do so. Nevertheless, if cloning human beings does not harm any human person, then both the 'Freedom to reproduce' principle and the 'Knowledge as a kind of human good' principle support researchers' freedom to clone. Thus, the kernel of the discussion is whether cloning human beings will cause harm to some human persons. Some people do think that cloning human beings is morally objectionable on the ground

that it will cause harm to others. This paper will focus on those harm-based objections. Two major harm-based objections will be discussed and it will be argued that these two harm-based objections are flawed.

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Abstract

The sheep Dolly was successfully cloned in a laboratory by a technique called somatic cell nuclear transfer. This success significantly increases the possibility of human cloning. The moral and legal debates around the cloning of humans surfaced again. This essay does not intend to address moral considerations primarily based upon technical concerns. For instance, the US National Bioethics Advisory Commission concludes that at this time it is morally unacceptable to attempt to create a child using somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning because this technique is not safe to use in humans at this time. Instead, this essay wants to explore a basic issue of moral principle: Does human cloning violate human dignity?

The first section argues that attempt to using state power to enforce an official, particular doctrine of human dignity upon every person in a pluralist society cannot be justified by rational moral argument. Many have asserted that human cloning is against human dignity; therefore, for them, human cloning should be prohibited in society. For example, UNESCO claims that "practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings, shall not be permitted." Many seem to assume that human dignity is a self-evident notion and all people have a consensus on its basic implications.

This essay illustrates that the concept of human dignity is ambiguous. People hold entirely different understandings of where human dignity lies. Distinct religions, traditions, and ideologies developed concrete and incommensurable theories regarding human dignity, based upon their respective metaphysical and moral premises. Among others, Immanuel Kant, the great Enlightenment philosopher, tried through rational philosophical argument to establish a universal doctrine of human dignity for human persons as such, independent of any particular religious and/or traditional understanding. However, Kant's efforts failed. His ethics of dignity falls into a dilemma. When it is universal, it is pure formalism. It cannot offer concrete moral guidance, such as an answer as to whether the practice of human cloning violates human dignity. When it offers concrete moral guidance, it already assumes certain particular moral premises that are not accepted by all individuals or moral communities; therefore, it becomes a type of dogmatism.

The failure of Kant's ethics of dignity is heuristic. We are not able to justify one particular understanding of human dignity through rational philosophical argument without begging the question. In the contemporary pluralist world, people hold different concrete conceptions of human dignity in general and their particular implications for the issue of human cloning in particular. While a devout Christian argues that the cloning of humans is contrary to God's normal design for human life and procreation, an atheist homosexual sees human cloning as a useful tool for his reproduction and thereby constitute a valuable way of preserving his human dignity. Since no one is able to establish a particular doctrine of human dignity as canonical without begging the question, it would be immoral to use state force to impose it upon everyone. Accordingly, it is morally inevitable to move to a self-choice-based individual ethics of human dignity from state-coercion-based official ethics of human dignity.

The second section of this essay argues that it is also morally inevitable to move to a communitarian ethics of human dignity from individual ethics of human dignity. Individual ethics of human dignity emphasizes individual determination. It states that there is something inviolable in the human individual. However, as to the question of what this inviolable thing is, individual ethics of human dignity can only tell us that it should be determined by individual choice and decision. It cannot tell us, however, what substantive standards we can use to make such decisions. In short, it sets up a formal concept of human dignity based on self-determination.

One cannot be satisfied with a formal concept of human dignity. When one obtains freedom to make choices in society, one wants to have substantive standards to guide his choice and shape his contentfull notion of human dignity. Such standards can only be found in particular moral communities. Only within a concrete moral community can people share enough fundamental moral premises and/ or recognize the same moral authority, so that they can form a contentfull moral perspective, including a vision of human dignity. From such a perspective, one can easily know what choices he should make, what obligations he should assume, and what kind of virtues he should nurture. And only from such a perspective, can he secure a profound understanding of human nature and human reproduction, and thereby be able to deal with the issue of whether the cloning of humans is against human dignity in a morally coherent way.

Evidently, different moral communities hold different and often conflicting religious faiths, metaphysical convictions, and moral understandings regarding

human nature and human dignity. In order to make an in-depth exploration of the moral issues of human cloning, one must come to terms with concrete notions and principles embraced by a particular moral community. The third section of this essay explores the Confucian understanding of human dignity and its implications for the moral issue of human cloning. As a long-standing moral tradition, Confucianism has profoundly influenced the moral lives of the East Asian people. This section argues that a comprehensive **Confucian** view of human dignity includes a normative requirement on the natural relationships between man and woman as well as parent and child. Such natural relationships, for Confucians, underlie the moral significance of human dignity. Any action that violates such natural relationships is contrary to human dignity.

From the Confucian understanding, human dignity, as well as human nature, is what Heaven imparts to human. "Heaven and earth existing, all things then got their existence. All things having existence, there came male and female. From the existence of male and female there came husband and wife. From husband and wife there came parent and child. From parent and child there came ruler and minister. From ruler and minister there came high and low. When [the distinction of] high and low had existence, there came the rules of propriety and righteousness" (I Ching: Xu Gua Zhuan). We should not take this saying as merely the Confucian vision of the natural genealogy of human society. Rather, this genealogy contains internal norms for the moral significance of human lives. For Confucians, it is through the good manifestation of the Dao of Heaven that every human is born to their parents. Although a blood tie between parent and child is not a necessary requirement for such a good manifestation, the relation of parent and child underlies the Confucian moral perspective over human society. Accordingly, any action or scientific innovation that jeopardizes the relation of parent and child violates human dignity. From the Confucian view, the cloning of humans destroys the relation of parent and child. Accordingly, it is morally unacceptable for Confucians to practice human cloning.

The essay concludes that it depends upon the content-full moral views of particular moral communities to answer the question of whether human cloning violates human dignity. It is morally inevitable to move to voluntarily-committed communitarian ethics of human dignity from state-coerced official ethics of human dignity. The state does not have moral authority to impose one particular view of human dignity on everyone. It ought only to maintain a social order in which members of particular moral communities can live concrete moral lives as they see

appropriate. For Confucians, the cloning of humans is against their view of human dignity. They should not be tempted to involve in the practice of human cloning. At the same time, they should not try to make their views become the orthodox ideology of a state to be impose upon others who do not accept it. The Confucian moral community should be one of many flourishing moral communities in the contemporary pluralist world.

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Abstract

To clone or not to clone? Having successfully cloned animals, should we clone human beings or should we ban human cloning? This paper explores some ethical concerns brought on by the possibility of human cloning. The cloning specifically referred to here is the asexual reproduction of a human by somatic cell nuclear transfer.

Five concerns are discussed. The first is genetic equivalence and identity. The second is genetic history and individual autonomy. The third is asexual reproduction. The fourth is experimentation risks. The fifth is cloning rights.

Genetic-Cloning not Person-Cloning

One main objection to human cloning arises from equating genetic reproduction with person reproduction. Because the clone derives his genes from the cloned, it is feared that cloning will make carbon copies of people. Although genetic reproduction will produce clones that resemble the cloned biologically, the two are different persons just as monozygotic twins are. External factors such as the environment, experiences and culture also shape a person. Human cloning will not call back the dead nor immortalise the living. It is in fact genetic cloning but never person cloning. It is not achievement cloning nor virtue cloning. The objection is based on genetic reductionism.

Genes with a History

Human cloning is sometimes equated with producing monozygotic twins. However the two are not the same because of the significant age difference between the clone and its cloned. Although identical twins share the same genes, their development is an unknown and full of possibilities as is the case for all newborn. Their future is open because their genetic make-up is, practically speaking, unique. However, in the case of the clone, its genes have a known history. The pre-existence of the genes will assert itself on the clone in one way or another. In the first place, the clone's coming into existence was not 'spontaneous' nor 'open' as in newborn by birth. It cannot claim as other humans can: "I am me." The clone is created in the image of the cloned and inevitably lives in its shadow. Its identity is being infringed upon by the history of its genes.

The pre-existence of the genes also constitutes a violation of the privacy of the

clone. Because the cloned has lived before it, the secrets of the clone's genes are opened for all to see. The clone of Stephen Hawking would thus lose its genetic confidentiality if he had cloned himself at the age of twenty before knowing his genetic problem. His clone will be what he is twenty years later.

The pre-existence of the genes also renders possible their commodification or commercialisation.

Asexual Reproduction

In nature's way, the inception of a new life occurs in the embrace and sexual union of man and woman, which is the culmination of the love between them. The new life is conceived and born out of an I-Thou relationship of love and commitment. The clone in an asexual reproduction is a product of technology rather than a gift within personal union. It is deprived of its right to having a biological father and a biological mother.

Moreover, cloning also assaults the traditional concept of parenthood and radically threatens the stability of family.

Cloning Risks

The high failure rate in cloning Dolly indicates clearly the much higher risks involved in human cloning. Malformed embryos will be produced and destroyed under current practice.

Malformed embryos have been inadequately justified by the proponents of human cloning on three grounds: that there are always unavoidable experimentation failures, that there are also risks in normal pregnancies and that the embryos have no moral rights before coming into existence. These justifications are found to be wanting. Moreover, to many who advocate respect for life, including the life of embryos, it is morally wrong to destroy embryos.

Furthermore there is the risk of malformed clones even though its can be reduced by the destruction of malformed embryos. The defects number of cloning are not fully known until years later or even a generation later. In the early stage of cloning development the clones remain objects of experiment throughout their entire lives. They have to live always under the threat of some possible adverse effect of cloning. This is morally unacceptable.

Cloning Rights

The issue of cloning rights can be complicated. Who has the right to

cloning? Do parents have the right to clone a child? Will they only be able to exercise the right jointly or can they do so separately? What happens when they are divorced? Will they forfeit this right when the child comes of age? Who owns the frozen embryo cloned earlier? Will the parents' right be an infringement on the person's right? Can they stop her from cloning herself? Can one clone more than a dozen of oneself? Does the right to clone entail patent right? Is the right to clone transferable or tradable?

It has often been assumed that the decision of cloning is entirely the parents' as the clone before coming into existence has no moral status. However in the case of cloning a child, is it necessary to have the consent of the child even though she is a minor? Are the parents guardians or pirates of her genome?

To Clone or Not to Clone

One must also bear in mind that the concept of reproductive right used by the proponents is very much a western concept and is at best a negative right which should not be placed above the right of the clone.

The answer to the question "To clone or not to clone?" is not a straight forward one. Human cloning will pose challenges in the realms of technology, law, society, morality, philosophy and religion. The most pressing question is not whether there is a case that can be justified for human cloning. It is rather whether our society has enough moral wisdom, courage and strength to guide the development and application of advancing science and technology including the possibility of human cloning. Before we can come to grips with the issues facing us, we should proceed with great care.

Abstract

The new ethical situation created by new discoveries in bioengineering needs the establishment of ethical criteria in order to judge the morality or immorality of a specific act in, for example, human cloning. But, in Chinese ethical tradition, especially in the Confucian one, much attention has been paid to normalize sexual behavior and no ethical consideration was done on reproduction outside human sexuality. Even this is the case, the general ethical principles established by Confucianism and other ethical traditions are still valid when applied to the newly emerging technological ethical issues. Therefore, in this paper, I would first derive from Confucian ethics and Western utilitarian ethics, obligation ethics and virtue ethics, five ethical criteria, restructured in a hierarchical order, for judging the ethical issues of human cloning. These criteria are: the criterion of conservation, the criterion of development, the criterion of free will, the criterion of excellence, the criterion of harmony.

Basically, the author of this paper sustain the position that only the criterion of conservation gives us the most supportive argument for doing human cloning, even if this argument is still defective. This means that we can clone a member of family or race in order to conserve it from total perishing or extermination. The criterion of conservation, articulated in Modern Western philosophy and also in Chinese culture, if not morally perfect in itself, serves the technical act of human cloning as the minimum requirement.

The criterion of development could be considered in two ways: differential variability and qualitative betterment. Considered from the side of differential variability, the technique of human cloning could be considered as a project of anti-differentiation or anti-variation. Still it could contribute to development only through conservation, of the otherwise perishing races or families for example. As to the qualitative betterment, it should be always achieved through volitional effort and not merely through biological genetic engineering.

All human action should be mediated by free will in order to become moral. This should be taken into account also in the human cloning experimentation. But this does not mean, if supported by conservation argument and motivated by altruistic reasons, human cloning cannot be performed without the consent of the future cloning, unable to give consent because of inexistence for the time being. In this case, cloning could be ethically

done, taking into account the moral example of donation of organs of the dead in accident, donation agreed by his/her parents rather than by the accident-victim. But this reasoning does not apply in the case of cloning motivated by commercial interest. But even if this kind of experimentation could be morally accepted, there is still a complementary condition: that there is no pre-visible danger, pain or discomfort caused by the experimentation.

Up from the criterion of free will, we enter into the domain properly human and moral. It is on this level, and also on the levels of arguments from excellence and harmony, that we find most of the ethical difficulties of human cloning. For example, in the case of criterion of excellence, all moral excellence are morally valuable when resulted from the decision of human free will and volitional effort. No one could be morally legitimate to conduct human cloning by reason of producing a human being with better human qualities. All human qualities are social and historically determined. One quality considered as good in one time could become bad in another. The biological experimentation conducted under the pretext of producing better human race could be just a sign of tyranny, as in the case of Hitler.

As I see it, many actual arguments against human cloning are based upon a social interpretation of the criterion of harmony. For example, that human cloning might be subversive to actual human sexual relationship, parenthood and family system. In my view, although ethical relationship is surely to be disturbed by human cloning, still this is not a sufficient argument against doing it. Because, for example, the argument of conservation could be more urgent and stronger. For me the most important consideration here is the interest of the child. It is of higher interest for the child that he/she be born with the love and care of his parents rather than becoming an object of human technological adventure.

Argument of conservation, being supportive of human cloning, could be realized and concretized through an ethical committee authorized by relevant laws to decide in which case and under what condition a particular case of human cloning could be interpreted as suitable for the criterion of conservation. But this enters the domain of legal institution and exceeds our ethical concern in this paper.